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Please note that the views expressed herein are those of the author
only, and do not reflect, in whole or in part, the official views of the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System.
HILE I have served as a central bank lawyer and official for
years, I have had little exposure to Islamic finance until re-
cently. In this respect, I believe I am typical of most U.S. bank
supervisors, who have had, for the most part, few opportunities to evalu-
ate Islamic financial products to date. While some Islamic products are
offered in the United States, there is currently no Islamic bank per se.
But this appears to be changing. The demand for Shariah-compliant
products is growing in the United States, in response to the demands of
Muslim consumers. With that growth, it is imperative that U.S. supervi-
sors understand and adapt as well. As public servants, we have a consti-
tutional responsibility to ensure that our regulations and practices
accommodate religious practice to the greatest extent that is possible con-
sistent with our statutes, regulations, and other supervisory objectives.
In this paper, I will review some of the regulatory challenges that an
Islamic bank might face in the United States, and also attempt to evaluate
these challenges-to gain a view as to the challenges that are significant
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and those that are not as hard as they appear. To a supervisor used to
conventional Western-style financial institutions, Islamic banks can, at
first, seem difficult to comprehend and understand and perhaps even ex-
otic. At first blush, Islamic banks look to turn conventional banking
practices on their head, especially with respect to their prohibition of in-
terest. But in order to serve the needs of the Muslim banking public,
regulators must work through their initial perceptions of the exoticism of
Islamic financial institutions. When they do, I think that they will find
that Islamic banking practices, much like other sophisticated financial
practices, can be made compatible with secular law. The regulatory chal-
lenges facing Islamic banks are complex, but I think in the end that they
will prove soluble.
An understanding of the main principles and practices of Shariah-com-
pliant finance is important to better comprehend Islamic banking and fi-
nancial services. Shariah is the Arabic word for Islamic law, also known
as the Law of Allah. My understanding is that Islam draws no distinction
between religious and secular life. Hence, Shariah covers not only relig-
ious rituals, but many aspects of day-to-day life, politics, economics,
banking, business or contract law, and social issues. Our focus is banking
and finance, so I will focus on some of the main Shariah principles con-
cerning those areas. The first and foremost such principle is that a person
should not make money from money. This restriction is classically mani-
fested as a prohibition against paying or receiving interest, or riba. It is
also manifested in the concept of shared risk between a depositor and a
bank and between a bank and what we would call a borrower. A deposi-
tor's fortunes should track the bank's fortunes, and a bank's fortunes
should track a borrower's fortunes. Other important Shariah principles
applicable to finance include prohibitions against speculation, or gharar,
and prohibitions against investments that might involve substances or ac-
tivities that are contrary to Islam, such as alcohol or gambling.
In short, Islamic banking is a form of banking with a conscience. Is-
lamic banks each have a Shariah board of Shariah scholars as well as
financial experts who are responsible for determining what activities are
and are not Shariah-compliant. One of the many challenges Western reg-
ulators face in understanding Islamic financial institutions is that the
Shariah board of one institution may determine that an activity is permis-
sible while the Shariah board of another financial institution may deter-
mine that it is not.
Turning now to the status of Islamic finance, this has been a period of
great growth for Islamic finance worldwide. Some have estimated that
there are more than $200 billion in deposits in Islamic financial institu-
tions worldwide, with growth at about 15 percent a year.1 Much of that
growth has occurred on the wholesale investment level. But there has
been notable growth in retail banking as well, especially in the Middle
1. Nigel Dudley, Islamic Finance Needs Solid Foundations, EUROMONEY, Jan. 2004.
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East and Southeast Asia.2 In the West, we have taken special note of the
chartering of the Islamic Bank of Britain last year as the first stand-alone
Islamic bank in Europe-a landmark event in the emergence of Islamic
banking.
Islamic financial services are expanding in the United States as well,
although still on a much smaller scale than in some overseas markets.
Again, much of this has occurred in the wholesale market, but a small
number of U.S. financial institutions offer products to retail consumers as
well. Shariah-compliant products have been provided both by conven-
tional banks, such as HSBC, Devon Bank, and University Bank, as a
component of their business, and also by non-bank financial institutions,
such as Guidance Financial and LARIBA Finance House. These institu-
tions have been particularly successful at introducing home finance prod-
ucts by using Islamic structures that are the functional equivalent of
residential mortgage loans.
Despite these noteworthy developments, as of yet, there is no Islamic
bank in the United States per se. That is, there is no stand-alone institu-
tion that is dedicated to Shariah compliance and that provides a full range
of banking services-checking accounts, deposit accounts, consumer loans,
etc.?to observant Muslims. At the Federal Reserve Bank of New York,
we have dedicated ourselves to keeping our ears to the ground on this
issue by co-sponsoring and/or attending a number of conferences and
meetings on Islamic banking. In this process, we have heard rumblings of
potential applications, but still have not seen anything concrete manifest
itself yet. Why not? I can only speculate. But U.S. demographics may
play a part. Since the census does not survey residents for religious pref-
erence, it is hard to quantify the number of Muslims in the United States
with any confidence, much less the number of Muslims whose religious
observance will motivate them to seek out Shariah-compliant financial
services. Published figures range from approximately 1 million to 7 mil-
lion, or roughly three tenths of 1 percent to 3.4 percent of the popula-
tion.3 Moreover, the United States is a big country. The Muslim
community is more dispersed in the United States than it is in the United
Kingdom, for example, where cities such as London and Birmingham
contained large, relatively concentrated populations.
Probably more important, however, is that starting a bank, any bank, is
difficult. Organizers of a new bank must identify a market in need of
their services, develop a profitable business plan, obtain financing, attract
and train competent staff, draft procedures and documentation appropri-
ate to their business, and they must undertake the often time-consuming
process of gaining regulatory approval.
2. Nigel Dudley, Shariah-Compliant Banking Takes Centre Stage, EUROMONEY, Sept.
2003.
3. Thomas C. Baxter, Jr., Gen. Counsel, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Welcome
Speech at Seminar on Legal Issues in the Islamic Financial Services Industry (Mar
2, 2005).
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Starting a new kind of bank is even more difficult. The potential mar-
ket is uncertain and the institution must design novel products that satisfy
both profit expectations and the expectations of Shariah compliance; ar-
range financing; contract an appropriate religious supervisory board; and
convince regulators to play along. Most of these challenges are inherent
in the process of starting a new kind of bank and must be left to market
participants to address. As bank supervisors, we are required to follow
the mandates of statute and regulation in evaluating the safety and
soundness of a financial institution, and an Islamic bank will be no excep-
tion from this principle.
That being said, I believe that regulators also have a constitutional
duty, within that statutory framework, to accommodate the free exercise
of religion to the maximum extent possible. The First Amendment con-
tains two principles affecting religion: that there neither be a government
establishment of religion nor a law prohibiting the free exercise thereof.
A corollary of the principle of religious freedom enshrined in our Consti-
tution is that the secular law should adapt, as much as possible, to accom-
modate differing religious practices. As public servants, we have a
mandate to gain sufficient familiarity with Islamic banking practices to
ensure that, as much as possible, our secular law does not burden the
religious practice of observant Muslims.
It is my impression, from my discussions with other U.S. bank supervi-
sors about this topic, that they accept this. In general, I sense a great
enthusiasm and curiosity about Islamic banking practices. Still, along
with this enthusiasm, it has also been my sense that many misconceptions
persist about what Islamic banks do: what they forbid, what they allow,
and how they differ from conventional banking organizations.
It is easy to be overwhelmed by the multitude of issues that Islamic
banks may seem to present. Some of the most frequently mentioned
include:
(1) their ownership of real estate;
(2) their likelihood of maintaining good programs for anti-money
laundering (AML) and Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) compliance; and
(3) whether their deposit products can be approved and insured.
Upon closer inspection, I believe the real estate and anti-money laun-
dering issues are less challenging than they first appear, and may require
no greater flexibility than supervisors have shown themselves willing to
exhibit in the context of other types of finance. But the provision of
Shariah-compliant deposit products presents more complex issues that
will require further thought and creativity from regulators and market
participants.
Let's take a closer look at each of these three areas, starting with own-
ership of real estate. One of the most frequent issues raised in respect of
the potential for Islamic banks to operate in the United States regards
whether they would violate restrictions on real estate ownership by
banks. Commercial banks in the United States are generally restricted
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from owning real property, apart from their own premises and parcels
they may have acquired through foreclosure proceedings. The latter must
generally be sold as soon as practicable. 4 These restrictions have poten-
tial implications for some of the most common Shariah-compliant, asset-
backed loan products, such as ijara and murabaha.
In general, an ijara is a contractual arrangement comparable to a sale/
leaseback, where the bank buys and then immediately leases an asset to a
consumer for a fee. The duration of the lease and the fee are set in ad-
vance, and are in many ways comparable to the terms that might apply to
a conventional loan. But paying a fee to occupy a home owned by the
bank instead of repaying a mortgage on a home owned by the occupant
avoids violating the Shariah's prohibitions against the occupant paying
interest and against the bank receiving interest. Similarly, a murabaha is
a cost-plus sale type of arrangement, where a bank purchases an asset on
behalf of a customer with the understanding that the customer will
purchase the asset back from the bank. The bank's price to the customer
includes a stated profit known to both parties, and the payments are am-
ortized across a payment period, similar to a traditional secured loan.
Ijara and murabaha techniques have been fruitfully used to finance the
purchase of residential property by observant Muslims. Given that these
transactions require banks to buy, sell, and hold title to real property,
some have mused that these techniques might conflict with U.S. restric-
tions on bank ownership of real property.
The secular purposes behind the long-standing U.S. restrictions on
bank ownership of real property are still germane today: to hinder specu-
lative activity, to ensure that the capital of banks are not tied up in static
assets, and to prevent the accumulation of large tracts of land by financial
institutions.5 It is also clear, however, that the risks meant to be ad-
dressed by these restrictions are not necessarily present in ijara and
murabaha transactions, where the bank takes title to property only for a
limited purpose.
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), as supervisor of
national banks, came to this conclusion in reviewing two separate applica-
tions in the late 1990s. In 1997 the OCC reviewed and approved a resi-
dential ijara product and in 1999 reviewed and approved a residential
murabaha product.6 Each of these decisions considered the contractual
features of each type of transaction in some detail. The agency concluded
that the products were the functional equivalent of residential secured
lending and, as such, permissible activities for a national bank.7 While
4. 12 U.S.C. § 29 (West 2006).
5. Nat'l Bank v. Matthews, 98 U.S. 621, 626 (1878).
6. OCC Interpretive Letter No. 806, 12 U.S.C. 24(7), 12 U.S.C. 371 (Dec. 1997),
available at http://www.failaka.com/Library/Articles/OCC%20and%20UBK%20
Lease.pdf; OCC Interpretive Letter No. 867, 12 USC 24(7), 12 USC 29 (Nov.




206 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 12
noting the general prohibition against the ownership of real property and
the policy considerations behind them, the OCC determined that these
policies were not implicated by the Islamic products. 8
Moreover, the OCC took great pains to point out that this functional
approach was not a novel one, and certainly not one unique to Islamic
finance. It cited numerous OCC and court precedents-reviewing bank
offerings of everything from net lease products to the sale of mortgage-
backed securities?where the economic substance of an activity, rather
than its form, was what mattered in determining permissibility for na-
tional banks.9
Shortly after these decisions, the New York State Banking Department
followed the OCC's analysis to approve ijara and murabaha products be-
ing offered by HSBC, and again found that these transactions were the
functional equivalent of otherwise permissible activity. 10
These are good examples of supervisors working cooperatively within
their statutory mandate. And it is important to note that neither of these
interpretations required a stretch: regulators have considerable experi-
ence in evaluating the substance of complicated transactions, experience
that can be brought to bear in this context.
Another frequently mentioned issue that I have encountered in this
area, and one that has, in my.opinion, already taken on out-sized signifi-
cance in the U.S. perception of Islamic finance, is BSA/AML compliance.
I think that the reason for this concern is probably obvious to most of
us: the horrific terror attacks that took place in Washington, Penn-
sylvania, and a few hundred yards from the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York on September 11, 2001. These attacks focused many Americans and
their elected officials on risks emanating from the Middle East. As a
practical reality, whether fairly or unfairly, the Islamic financial services
industry has been subject to extra scrutiny as a result of this.
In the wake of the September 11 attacks, some observers speculated
that Islamic banking transactions might facilitate terrorists' access to
funds. I think that much of this speculation derived from a rudimentary
understanding of Islamic financing techniques-or worse, from stereo-
types. For example, some have posited that Islamic deposit products,
which typically involve a profit-and-loss sharing (PLS) mechanism rather
than the payment of interest, might be susceptible to abuse because their
commingling of funds would "creat[e] ready opportunities for anonymous
money transfers and settlement."'1 While this type of statement has a
surface plausibility, when you get down into the details, it is hard to see
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Letter from Jay Kane, Assistant Counsel, N.Y. State Banking Dep't, to Patricia
Grace, HSBC Bank USA (Aug. 27, 2001); Letter from Barbara Kent, Assistant
Counsel, N.Y. State Banking Dep't, to John G. Holinka, HSBC Bank USA (Apr.
12, 1991).
11. WILLIAM F. WECHSLER ET AL., TERRORIST FINANCING: REPORT OF AN INDEPEN-
DENT TASK FORCE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 9-10 (N.Y. Council on For-
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how a PLS account creates any more risk than any ordinary deposit ac-
count. That an account's value may fluctuate up or down depending on
the success of a bank's investments-and I will discuss these accounts
more fully later-does not, in my view, distinguish it in any meaningful
way from an account that steadily accrues interest and moves up and
down in conjunction with deposits and withdrawals. Any PLS adjustment
to a deposit account can be documented and verified just as easily as any
adjustment to a deposit account resulting from the payment of interest,
deposits, or withdrawals can be. Perhaps it can be documented even
more easily and with greater certainty because the same adjustment will
have been made on a pro-rata basis to all of the deposit accounts on an
Islamic bank's books.
Other observers have simply conflated Islamic finance with the infor-
mal trust-based money transfer system, commonly referred to as hawala,
that exists in the Middle East and some other Muslim countries, and that
did have some role in the financing of the September 11, 2001 attacks.
Since hawala is often associated in people's minds with Islamic finance, I
will take a moment to explain hawalas so that you can better appreciate
the difference between hawala and Islamic finance.
A hawala arrangement, in its simplest form, is one where money is
transferred via a network of hawala brokers, or hawaladars. A customer
approaches a hawala broker in one city and gives a sum of money to be
transferred to a recipient in another, usually foreign, city. The hawala
broker contacts another hawala broker in the recipient's city, gives dispo-
sition instructions of the funds (usually minus a small commission), and
promises to settle the debt at a later date. The unique feature of the
system is that no promissory instruments are exchanged between the
hawala brokers; the transaction takes place entirely on the honor system.
Consequently, no records are produced of individual transactions; only a
running tally of the amount owed by one broker to another is kept.
The possibilities for untraceable transfers of terrorist funds are obvi-
ous. But hawala is not related in any way to Islamic finance or Shariah
compliance and is neither exclusive to, nor universal within, the Islamic
world. It is simply a commercial practice that developed in medieval
times to safely transfer value over long distances in the absence of any
legal or technological infrastructure.
A more subtle concern was expressed by Professor El-Gamal of Rice
University in his testimony before a congressional committee hearing ear-
lier this year. 12 Professor El-Gamal's overall conclusion was that "there
is no reason - in theory - to suspect that Islamic finance would be particu-
larly immune or particularly vulnerable to abuse by money launderers or
eign Relations 2002), available at http://www.9-llcommission.gov/hearings/
hearingl/witness wolosky.htm.
12. Mahmoud El-Gamal, Chair of Islamic Econ., Fin. & Mgmt., Rice Univ., Prepared
Statement for the U.S. Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs:
Money Laundering and Terror Financing in the Middle East (July 13, 2005), availa-
ble at http://banking.senate.gov/_files/gamal.pdf.
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terrorist financiers. ' 13 Professor El-Gamal worried, though, that Middle
Eastern regulators lacked the familiarity with complicated financial tech-
niques that had been developed in the West, and that this lack of exper-
tise might lead to regulators not grasping the purpose of Islamic bank
transactions. 14
While I appreciate Professor El-Gamal's praise for Western supervi-
sors, I do take his point as well. In their supervision of these institutions,
U.S. supervisors will need to come up to speed on Islamic financial prod-
ucts in order to appropriately evaluate them for BSA/AML and other
risks. That said, as Prof. El-Gamal notes, U.S. bank supervisors often
grapple with complexity in our supervision of conventional large complex
banking organizations.15 Our responsibility to carefully supervise such
arrangements does not differ in an Islamic context from a conventional
context.
The third, and in my view the most difficult category of challenges
presented by Islamic finance from a U.S. regulatory standpoint, is the
provision of Shariah-compliant deposit products.
First, some Islamic deposit products sit comfortably within U.S. stat-
utes and regulations. Non-interest-bearing current accounts and checking
accounts fully satisfy the mandates of both secular and religious law. The
challenge comes in designing a deposit account for an institution that is
insurable by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) that will
serve the function of an investment or other interest-bearing account,
while also observing Islam's prohibition of either paying or receiving riba.
As a practical matter, any bank seeking a new charter in the United
States will probably need to become a federally insured depository insti-
tution.16 To do so, the bank will need to satisfy the requirements of the
FDIC and the relevant chartering authority on the structuring of its in-
vestment accounts.
Islamic banks abroad typically offer investment products by offering
PLS accounts. These are structured so that the bank has something like a
joint investment with the depositor, with returns based on a portion of
the profits earned by the bank or the bundle of investments made by the
bank and not on a set rate. That way, if the bank loses money, so does
the account holder. The sharing of risk is a key component of Shariah-
compliant finance. Without legislative intervention, it may be hard for
the FDIC and the relevant chartering authority to approve an institution
whose deposit products will allow for the possibility of loss. For example,




16. See 12 U.S.C. § 222 (West 2006); 12 U.S.C. § 1842(e) (banks that are or are part of
bank holding companies); state law generally requires that banks be required to
have federal deposit insurance, MILTON R. SCHROEDER, THE LAW AND REGULA-
TION OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS §2 .01(5)(A) (Sheshunoff Information Services,
AS Pratt & Sons Group 1995).
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ing a profit-and-loss deposit product it proposed to offer through Univer-
sity Bank in response to the FDIC's requirement that the principal be
guaranteed.17 SHAPE's experience illustrates the challenge that Islamic
institutions will face on the deposit side of their business.
An additional difficulty arises from the FDIC insurance itself. Some
Muslims consider traditional insurance arrangements to violate prohibi-
tions against both riba and gharar. This is because a traditional insurance
arrangement involves one party paying a premium in exchange for a pos-
sible payment on a future date, and this it is thought to resemble
gambling. 18
This is an interesting example of where secular purposes and religious
principles seem to collide. To a western bank regulator, deposit insurance
is the furthest thing from gambling: it is one of our most important tools
to preserve the predictability of consumer deposits and the safety and
soundness of the banking system. Given the importance of these require-
ments under the U.S. bank regulatory system, these will probably require
some flexibility from Islamic institutions, together with sincere coopera-
tion from supervisors.
This is what occurred with the Islamic Bank of Britain. Britain has a
deposit insurance scheme similar to the U.S. bank insurance scheme. Af-
ter a long period of intensive consultation with the United Kingdom Fi-
nancial Services Authority, the Islamic Bank of Britain (IBB) came up
with a deposit product that satisfied both secular and religious impera-
tives. In theory, the IBB's investment accounts have the possibility of
both profit and loss. But the bank undertakes to make good any losses
on the account. 19 In case of a loss, the bank invites devout customers to
sign a voluntary waiver of this offer, in order to comply with Shariah
law.20 Depositors who sign this waiver would not be eligible to receive
insurance of their deposit in accordance with Britain's insurance
scheme.21
This is a hopeful example that illustrates the value of flexibility and
good will of both the regulator and the regulated. I would hope that the
17. Abdulkader Thomas, Equity Finance Vehicles: Mudaraba and Musharaka, in
STRUCTURING ISLAMIC FINANCE TRANSACTIONS 54 (Abdulkader Thomas et al.
ed., Euromoney Books 2005); see also SHAPE Deposit Accounts, UNIVERSITY IS-
LAMIC FINANCIAL CORPORATION, http://www.university-bank.com/IslamicBank-
ing/deposit.html.
18. FRANK E. VOGEL & SAMUEL HAYES III, ISLAMIC LAW AND FINANCE: RELIGION,
RISK, AND RETURN (Kluwer Law International 1998).
19. The bank also undertakes that, in case of a shortfall, (i) it will forego receipt of
fees, (ii) it will dip into a profit stabilization reserve to the extent of the shortfall,
and (iii) its directors will not declare a distribution to shareholders until there is no
shortfall. Islamic Bank of Britain, Consumer Banking Terms & Conditions Cur-
rent Account & Savings Accounts, http://www.islamic-bank.com/imagesupload/
PersonalApplicationForm+TCs.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2006).
20. Tim Plews, Establishing Islamic Banks in the West: The Case of the Islamic Bank of
Britain, in ISLAMIC RETAIL BANKING AND FINANCE: GLOBAL CHALLENGES AND
OPPORTUNITIES 37-38 (Sohail Jaffe red., Euromoney Books 2005).
21. Kate Burgess, Bank Gains Authorization to Accept Deposits, FIN. TIMES UK, Aug.
14, 2004.
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level of cooperation that was achieved between the IBB and the British
regulators can be duplicated on this side of the Atlantic. Still, it should
be pointed out that innovation may have some limits. The IBB compro-
mise required that their Shariah supervisory board become comfortable
with this arrangement. Other Shariah supervisory boards may or may not
take the same view. Thus, it remains a possibility that bank statutes and
regulations will allow a certain shape of religious observance in the finan-
cial services arena, but will not be able to encompass others.
These are some of the highlights of the issues that might confront an
American Islamic bank. But I expect a host of other challenges to pre-
sent themselves to the operators of an Islamic bank. One area that I
consider particularly compelling regards consumer protection. When a
customer comes to an Islamic bank, he or she probably does so for rea-
sons that go far beyond interest rates and convenience of service: that
customer wants to know that their financial services comply with the dic-
tates of conscience. How does a customer know this? Will regulators
have a role in protecting that customer?
A regulator's role in protecting a consumer from suffering harm in a
religious context is a delicate one, as the regulator will always need to be
mindful of constitutional concerns regarding the government establish-
ment of religion. As an example, you may recall a decision of the Second
Circuit a few years back, invalidating New York State's regulatory regime
for preventing kosher fraud.22 The State of New York provided for the
inspection and certification of meats that were to be sold as kosher to
consumers.23 A meat packer alleged that New York's standards for what
qualified as kosher adopted a view of kosher that was particular to one
group of Orthodox Jews and was not one shared by all observant Jews in
New York. 24 In reviewing the complaint, the Second Circuit found that
the challenged laws "excessively entangle[d] government and religion"
because they took sides on a religious question and created an impermis-
sible fusion of state and religious functions.25
A supervisor of an Islamic bank might also need to be cognizant of
such concerns. Islamic financial institutions generally have a body re-
ferred to as a Shariah supervisory board that reviews and approves their
practices and procedures for compliance with religious principles. Be-
cause the interaction of religion and finance can be complex, these boards
can disagree with each other on what is compliant with the Shariah and
what is not. I think that a supervisor would have a very difficult time
wading into these waters.
Even absent the religious component, establishing rules regarding un-
fair or deceptive acts and practices can be tricky. Regulators have wres-
tled for many years with the question of how to deal with the green





marketing of products with an eye to protecting consumers who make
their shopping choices based on what is good for the environment. The
answer may ultimately lie with the securities regulator's best friend: sun-
shine. Transparency is all the more important for an Islamic bank, given
the complexity of their practices, and the importance that their customers
attach to how they conduct their business.
Bank supervisors will need to seriously weigh how well existing bank
disclosure statutes and regulations can accomplish this goal for Islamic
customers. The Truth in Savings Act and the Truth in Lending Act were
each passed in order to make sure that customers received certain basic
information about deposits and consumer loans, respectively, even as the
forms that deposits and loans are furnished grew continually more
complex.2 6
Supervisors and Islamic banks will need to think carefully about the
disclosures that the current regulations require for an Islamic bank. For
example, what disclosures will need to be made regarding a bank's meth-
ods for investing and then distributing pooled depositors' funds? Again, I
don't pretend to know the answer to these questions at this point, but I
present them as an important subject for further contemplation.
Furthermore, I hope that I have managed to convey my optimism
about the possibility of chartering an Islamic bank in the United States.
There are quite a number of complex questions that will need to be at-
tended to in the chartering of an Islamic bank in the United States, in
order to ensure that Shariah-compliant banking services are offered
safely and soundly, and in compliance with the imperatives of secular law.
But coping with complexity is nothing new for bank supervisors. It is
very much our stock in trade. I look forward to bank supervisors using
this accrued capability, flexibly, and creatively to permit the fullest extent
of religious observance that is consistent with our statutes.
26. MILTON R. SCHROEDER, TIE LAW AND REGULATION OF FINANCIAL Institutions
§ 18.05 & § 22.03 (A.S. Pratt & Sons 2005).
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